The Australian government implemented a sequence of new policy initiatives during 1997-2000 with a stated aim of raising the take-up rate of private health insurance (PHI).
Introduction
The Australian health care system is based on an universal access principle, under which every person regardless of income is entitled to be a member of Medicare, a universal health insurance scheme. However, private health insurance (PHI) has always been a prominent feature of the Australian health system, despite the availability of a publicly funded alternative since 1975.
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For much of the 1990s, some 30% to 40% of the population is covered by PHI. It is, however, plainly obvious that the coverage of PHI has been on a declining trend since the introduction of Medibank in 1975. There are a variety of reasons, not least of which is the appeal of the publicly funded alternative (Medibank/Medicare) to the masses.
With a purported goal of reducing the burden on public hospitals, the Australian government implemented a sequence of new policies during 1997-2000. The three major policy initiatives are, in chronological order: (i) The Private Health Insurance Incentives Scheme (PHIIS), introduced in 1997, which imposes a tax levy on high-income earners who do not have PHI, and a means-tested subsidy scheme for low-income earners who purchase PHI. (ii) A 30% premium rebate, introduced in 1999, to replace the means-tested subsidy under PHIIS. The 30% rebate is non-means tested, and applies to all private health insurance policies, including existing ones that were already in place.
(iii) Lifetime Health Cover (LHC), introduced in 2000, permits a limited form of agerelated risk rating by private health insurance funds. Under LHC, insurance funds are allowed to discriminate consumers by age at time of entry. The immediate aim of these policies was to raise the take-up rate of private health insurance (PHI). As a result of these policies, the proportion of the population with private hospital cover increased from 31% in 1999 to more than 45% in 2001, an increase of more than 14 percentage points in two years. Two components of the new policies, the 30% premium rebate and Lifetime Health Cover (LHC), have been widely regarded as the most effective in raising the PHI take-up rate.
It is not clear, however, what proportion of the increase can be attributed to which of those policies. Butler (2002) examines the trend in the proportion of population with private hospital insurance cover between June 1984 and March 2002. By noting the timing of the sequential policies introduced beginning in mid-1997, he argues that it was LHC that induced the bulk of the increase in PHI take-up rate. Using a similar policy timing idea but with a more rigorous trend analysis, Frech et al. (2003) attempt to measure the relative impact of the different policies. They estimate that the 30% rebate lead to an 11% increase in PHI demand. However, they were not able to disentangle the effects of the rebate and the LHC.
This difficulty in discerning the separate effects of the policies can have significant consequences when the cost differential across policies is large. In fact, the substantial cost differences between the two policies have attracted heated debate among academics and policymakers as to the cost-effectiveness of each policy. Duckett and Jackson (2000), for example, estimate that the 30% rebate costs more than $2 billions per year while LHC costs practically nothing to the government. Therefore, from a cost efficiency point of view, it is clearly desirable to be able to distinguish the contributions of the two policies for a more cost effective policymaking. This paper departs from previous studies by using micro-level cross-section data to disentangle the effects of the two policies. We argue that although a significant proportion of the increase in PHI coverage occurred after the introduction of LHC, this policy was introduced on top of, not in place of, the 30% premium rebate and the tax levy under PHIIS. This means that the separate contributions of these policies cannot be readily inferred from time series data. Using cross-sectional micro-level data, this paper contributes to the discussion by providing separate estimates of the effects of the 30% rebate and LHC. As a significant improvement over previous studies, this paper estimates micro-level model of PHI demand and takes advantage of the design of the two policies to separate their effects.
Using unit record data from the 1995 and 2001 National Health Survey (NHS) data, in this paper we estimate PHI demand equations before and after the implementation of the new policies separately for single individuals and families. This allows us to construct a counterfactual scenario to measure the effects of the new policies on PHI take-up rate for those people who are highly unlikely to be covered without these new policies. Furthermore, utilizing the age criterion of the LHC policy, we are able to isolate the contribution of LHC. For singles, we find that the LHC accounts for at least 42% and at most 61% of the total increase in take-up rate. For families, the corresponding figures are 42% and 78% of the total increase, respectively. The total effects of LHC, inclusive of singles and familes, are estimated to be between 42% and 75% of the total increase.
Therefore, while these figures show the significant impact of LHC on PHI take-up, they are much lower than those suggested by previous studies.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief discussion on the changes in the private health insurance policies. This will be followed by the empirical model specifications and an explanation of data and variable construction in section 3. In section 4 we discuss and interpret the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
PHI Policy Changes
There are three major sets of PHI policy changes implemented between 1997 and 2000 which may affect PHI demand. The first set, introduced in 1997, includes a meanstested PHI premium subsidy and a 1% Medicare tax surcharge for high income earners who is not covered by an approved PHI policy. Then, in 1999, the means tested rebate was replaced with a non-means tested 30% premium rebate for all PHI policies. Finally, introduced in 2000, are Lifetime Health Cover (LHC), which allow health funds to discriminate consumers according to their age of entry into the fund. Because of the continuing decline in PHI take-up rate even after the introduction of the first set of policies, the 30% premium rebate and particularly LHC, have been widely regarded as the most effective policies and therefore are the focus of most earlier studies.
The basic idea of the LHC scheme is to induce the low risk population back into the private health insurance system. It was mainly a response to the findings that more and more low-risk individuals were leaving the PHI system, resulting in a system consisting mostly of the high-risk groups-a phenomenon often referred to as the "adverse selection spiral" (see for example, Industry Commission, 1997). Consequently, the scheme was designed around a financial penalty for the low risk groups. The target group was individuals between 30 and 65 years old. The amount of the penalty is set at 2% of the premium for each year beyond the age of 30 for anyone in the targeted population entering a health fund for the first time.
As can be seen from Figure 1 Finally, consumer theory asserts that what matters in the end is whether or not having PHI is optimal given an individual's budget constraint. In fact, slightly more than 60% of families without PHI cited costs as a reason why they did not purchase PHI (see 
Empirical Framework and Data
The specification of our empirical models follows Cameron and Trivedi (1991) , and is quite similar to other earlier Australian based studies such as Hopkins and Kidd 
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Percent pop. insured purchase PHI can thus be specified as a discrete choice model. That is, defining the binary variable PHI as an observed random variable with value 1 if PHI is chosen, and value 0 otherwise. The probability of purchasing PHI is
where x is a vector of observable individual characteristics, β is the corresponding vector of parameters to be estimated, and e is a random term representing the unobservables.
We specify f so that (1) purchased PHI even when there were no policy change, and (ii) those whose purchasing decision was more of a response to the new policies. Furthermore, utilizing the age dependent design of the LHC policy, we separate the impact of LHC from that of the 30% premium rebates. This is done by taking the difference in the average probabilities between the LHC target group (age 30-69) and the non-target group (age 18-29). 1=if hospital cover (with or without ancillary) is purchased.
(for family, 1=if at least one family member has hospital cover). Table 1 , we also include 13 regional dummy variables, which denote whether the unit's residence is in a metro or rural area in each state/territory, and 13 age dummy variables, with value 1 if the unit's age falls in the indicated age interval. Table 2 summarizes the estimated coefficients of the PHI demand model as specified in (1), for singles and families, and in 1995 and 2001. As can be seen from the table, most age slightly older than 65. As will be argued later in the paper, even if this results in an overestimation of LHC effects, the estimated effects are still less than what commonly believed.
Results
of the usual determinants of PHI demand are significant and have the expected signs.
Demand is increasing in income, but this effect is diminishing as suggested by the negative sign of the squared income term. This probably captures the preference for private health care and at the same time the ability to afford the costs of the insurance. Comparing the coefficients of 1995 and 2001, we see that the signs of estimated coefficients are mostly as expected and consistent in both years. For examples, the coefficients for gender, income, education, occupation, risk aversion, and health risks are quite stable in both years. There is no variable which shows a significant reversal in sign from positive significant to negative significant or vice versa. Except for "drvisit3" and "drvisit4" of families, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients decrease between the two periods. However, the other risk-related variables, e.g., number of chronic conditions and smoking, seem to provide contradicting evidence.
Other interesting results come from the comparison of the age coefficients. Since all other policy changes except LHC are basically age independent, we would expect that on average, the distance between LHC target group (age 30-65) and LHC non-target group (age 18-29 and age 65+) would increase. In other words, since the base age group Columns 2-4 of Table 3 provide the breakdown of the above figures into three age groups:
18-29, 30-69, and 70+. For example, from columns 3 Table 3 However, in order to arrive at an estimate of an upper bound of the LHC effects, we will ignore this possibility. Thus, if we attribute all new PHI enrollees in the LHC target group to LHC, we can say that at most 61% of all singles who responded to the new policy initiatives were due to LHC. That is, 61% is an upper bound of the total effects of LHC on singles. By the same reasoning, we obtain the upper bound of the LHC effect for families as 78%. Notice however that the true effects are probably much lower than these upper bounds since the latter are obtained on the assumption that individuals and families in Age Group 2 responded only to LHC and not other policy initiatives.
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Before we proceed to the estimation of the lower bounds, we note that the first and third groups defined above are not, by policy design, LHC target groups. Furthermore, note that the first group is probably the least risky group in terms of expected medical needs. On the other hand, the third group can be considered as the highest risk group.
In addition, the first two groups' risk profiles might be more similar than the last two groups'. In other words, controlling for all other observable PHI determinants, the first group predicted probabilities would be a better reflection of the effects of non-LHC policies, chiefly the 30% premium rebate, than the last group's. Also, we can expect that the difference between Groups 1 and 2 is a much more accurate reflection of the LHC effects than the difference between Groups 2 and 3. Therefore, we will use the difference between the first two groups to arrive at the lower bound estimates.
We first need to isolate the effects of LHC from those PHI members attributed to the new policies by taking into account the marginal effects of the age variables. Table 4 presents the average marginal effects of all age variables with respect to the base age group (age 40-44) in 2001. In addition, the table also gives the predicted probabilities for the base age group so that the predicted probabilities of all other age groups can be inferred directly from their marginal effects. These age-dependent variations in predicted probabilities will allow the effects of LHC to be separated from other effects.
Looking at the within group averages on Table 4 , the predicted probabilities of having PHI for for singles in groups 1 and 2 are 11.5% and 37.2%, respectively. For families, the corresponding figures are 27.6% and 58.3%. Then, by our previous reasoning, the difference between the average probabilities of Groups 1 and 2 can be treated as the part of predicted probabilities in Group 2 attributable to LHC. These differentials are 25.7 (=37.2 -11.5) percentage points and 21.1 percentage points for singles and families, respectively. That is, expressed as a percentage of the within group average probabilities, We use the above probabilities to break down the proportion of population in the LHC target group as shown in the third column of Table 5 . The first row under each Singles or Families heading is nothing but the proportion of new PHI members presented in Table 3 earlier. In particular, the value in the last row under each heading in column 3 of Table 5 represents a lower bound estimate of the proportion of population new to PHI due to LHC. For example, for singles, 6.4 (68% × 9.4) percentage points is the estimated effects of LHC. This is approximately 41% of all 15.5 percentage points singles who responded to the new policy initiatives regardless. It is quite possible that, for some reasons, the effects of LHC spillover into the non-targeted age groups. Since the previous figure is obtained by assuming that LHC does not affect the other two age groups, then it is more appropriate to be treated as the lower bound of the LHC effect on singles.
By the same reasoning, we arrive at the lower bound for families, which is estimated to be around 42% (=11.0/23.5). We need to stress that the true magnitude of the total effects would be closer to the lower bound than to the upper bound. This is because the potential spillover effects of LHC on Groups 1 and 3, say because of confusion in understanding the regulations, are most likely to be smaller than the potential effects of other non-LHC related, age-correlated determinants that we ignored in estimating the upper bounds.
Lastly, it is worth noting that a weighted average scheme can be used to obtain an interval estimate for the total effect of LHC on the whole population. Since approximately 20% of the respondents in the 2001 NHS are singles, thus a 1:4 ratio seems appropriate.
Using this weight, we estimate that LHC accounts for between 42% and 75% of the rise in PHI membership in the Australian population. For the same reasons we mentioned above, we think the true value is likely to be much closer to the former than the latter. 
Conclusion
Economic efficiency alone dictates that if a policy costs less and yields higher desired effects, then it should be a preferred option. Among the recent Australian private health insurance policy initiatives, the Lifetime Health Cover policy costs almost nothing while the 30% premium rebate costs approximately $2 billions per year. The crucial question is whether or not the latter, a much more expensive policy, is completely ineffective, as claimed by many authors and policy commentators.
By looking at time series data and noting the date of implementation, one gets the impression that Lifetime Health Cover seems to account for most of the increase in private health insurance take-up rates. Such a conclusion could be warranted if not for the following considerations. First, the 30% premium rebate pre-dated Lifetime Health
Cover, thus the jump in private health insurance memberships one observes may very well be due to the rebate as well. Second, Lifetime Health Cover is very specific in its target groups and these target groups account for less than 72% of private health insurance membership in 2001. Moreover, a significant proportion of those in the target groups were in fact already covered by private health insurance before those policy initiatives were implemented. Thus, the increase in private health insurance memberships in these groups may not account for the bulk of the overall increase in private health insurance memberships. Third, data from the 2001 National Health Survey indicate that only a small fraction of people in the target groups cited Lifetime Health Cover as their reasons for purchasing private health insurance.
Mindful of these arguments, we proceed to untangle the effects of the Lifetime Health
Cover from other policy initiatives. We do so by estimating private health insurance demand models using micro-level data before and after the policy initiatives were in place. The main findings are that Lifetime Health Cover accounts for at least 42% and at most 75% of the overall increase in private health insurance membership. We also argue that the true share of Lifetime Health Cover would probably be much closer to the lower bound. Thus, we can conclude that the contribution of the 30% premium rebate could be far more substantial than most authors and commentators believe.
There are several possibilities of how this study can be improved. First, in modeling private health insurance demand, we do not consider the fact that PHI in Australia is secondary to a freely available alternative, the Medicare. A more careful modeling of such duplicate cover, for example see Vera-Hernandez (1999), may result in more precise estimates. Another important improvement can be made by carefully taking into account the effects of the 1% Medicare levy on high income earners. This can be done, for example, by using the regression discontinuity approach by exploiting the fact that the levy only kicks in after a specific income threshold. This should result in a more precise accounting of the contributions of each policy initiative.
